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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Leonard G. Young, Jr., a Pennsylvania prisoner with a 
long history of mental illness, filed suit alleging that 
Appellees-Defendants1 violated his Eighth Amendment rights 
                                              
 1 Appellees-Defendants include Jeffrey Martin, Deputy 
Superintendent Greene SCI, in his official and individual 
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by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for 
fourteen hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or 
others.  Because we agree with Young that the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
against him, we will vacate the judgment and remand for 
further proceedings.  
I. Factual Background 
 For over six years, Young has been held in solitary 
confinement, housed in either the Restrictive Housing Unit 
(“RHU”) or the mental health unit of different Pennsylvania 
prisons because of his extensive disciplinary history and 
history of mental illness.  Since childhood, Young has been 
diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including 
bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder.  However, since 
his detention over these past several years in solitary 
confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and 
one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays, 
Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified, 
including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid 
thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of 
self-harm, and suicidal impulses.  Indeed, since living in these 
conditions of prolonged isolation, his numerous suicide 
attempts have included efforts to hang himself and to break 
his own neck by banging his head against the wall.  
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 On the evening of September 20, 2009, while Young 
was confined in the RHU at State Correctional Institution 
(“SCI”)-Greene, his cell door was mistakenly unlocked and 
left open by a Corrections Officer (“CO”) in the control room.  
He exited his cell, walked up the stairs to the second tier of 
the RHU, and seated himself on an internal ledge above the 
law library.  What next transpired was captured in the 
ordinary course by prison surveillance cameras and handheld 
video cameras operated by COs.2   
 When other inmates saw Young on the roof they began 
calling to him from their cells.  In the meantime, Lieutenant 
Kirby and a group of COs gathered on the floor below 
Young.  From his perch, Young shouted that he was 
protesting for prisoners’ rights and for the return of some of 
his property.  Two COs watching Young from the balcony 
chatted with each other and laughed as he talked.  Young 
remained crouched on the roof voicing his complaints for 
approximately seven minutes before following the COs’ 
orders to step back onto the second tier and to close himself 
inside the shower.  Once there, he again complied with 
orders, placed his hands behind his back, and pushed his 
forearms through the shower tray slot so the COs could 
handcuff and then remove him, secured, from the shower.  As 
the COs escorted him to the stairs, Young passively refused to 
walk by laying down on the ground.  His ankles then were 
                                              
 2 The facts set forth here are drawn from the video and 
documentary evidence of record.  In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we must draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the nonmoving party; we therefore set forth the 
facts in the light most favorable to Young.  See Tri-M Grp., 




shackled and the COs carried him down the stairs.  Young 
again passively refused to walk when they reached the bottom 
of the staircase.  At no time throughout this incident did 
Young verbally threaten or attempt to physically engage any 
of the COs. 
 After the COs carried Young to a nearby corridor and 
placed him face down on the ground with his hands and 
ankles cuffed, four COs stood over him and further restrained 
his limbs.  Young remained motionless on the ground and did 
not struggle during this process.  However, rather than asking 
Young to submit to a routine strip search and although he had 
not spit on anyone, the COs placed a spit mask on him and 
cut off Young’s clothes to perform a prone strip search.3  
Young complained but did not physically resist the search; no 
contraband was found.   
 After the search was complete, Young, naked, cuffed, 
and compliant, was hoisted to his knees and photographed for 
several minutes to record any injuries he may have sustained 
during the incident.  While the pictures were taken, 
Lieutenant Kirby left the scene to obtain the requisite 
authorization for placing Young in a four-point restraint chair.  
Young repeatedly asked why he was going to be placed in a 
restraint chair, but received no answer.4  When the restraint 
                                              
 3 As a matter of prison policy, a strip search is 
performed after an inmate escapes from his cell to ensure that 
he did not acquire any contraband.   
 
 4 In a videotaped debriefing immediately following 
Young’s placement in the observation cell, Lieutenant Kirby 
acknowledged that Young was secured by the COs after 
Young stepped into the shower but went on to say that he was 
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chair arrived, he was strapped into it, naked, and a smock was 
placed over his lap.  Again, Young did not physically resist 
the COs but he did object to his treatment.  He complained 
several times that the restraints were too tight and he cried out 
in pain while being strapped into the chair and again when he 
was wheeled to a psychiatric observation cell.  Young also 
repeatedly asked that the smock on his lap be adjusted to fully 
cover his genitals, but the COs refused to comply with his 
request. 
 At approximately 8:46 p.m., Young was wheeled into 
the air-conditioned cell and left naked, except for the smock 
on his lap.  Upon his arrival, a nurse determined that his 
straps were too tight and loosened them accordingly.  As 
reflected in the reports generated over the time he spent in the 
psychiatric observation cell, medical personnel continued to 
                                                                                                     
placed in the restraint chair due to the seriousness of his 
actions.  Written reports prepared after the incident also state 
that Young was placed in the restraint chair “due to his 
actions,” J.A. 314, and that “due to [the] seriousness of [his] 
actions and blatant disregard for potential injury to himself or 
staff that inmate Young would be [p]laced in the restraint 
chair to prevent him from harming himself or staff.  This was 
authorized by the [s]hift commander prior to placement,” J.A. 
312.  A different report states that “[d]ue to the serious[] 
nature of the inmate[’]s actions, and his continued refusal of 
orders, Capt. Gumbarevic determined that the inmate should 
be placed into the restraint chair for his protection.  After 
conferring with Dep. Martin, and Act. Supt. Capozza, 
restraint chair placement was authorized.”  J.A. 308.   
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monitor Young’s condition.  Around 11:00 p.m., Young told 
a nurse that he wanted to move his hands “a bit” and was 
“talkative and joking [with] staff in no distress” or pain.  J.A. 
193.  Young fell asleep in the chair sometime after 1:20 a.m. 
and woke up at 5:20 a.m., requesting “a shot in the ass” of 
pain medication.  J.A. 193, 196.  He was “cooperative,” 
agreed to see a psychiatrist and take medication, and 
lamented the “next time” he would be in the restraint chair 
because “that’s just how it is [with him].”  J.A. 196.   
 Later in the morning, Young was still naked in the 
chair and became agitated because of his continued restraint.  
Upset, he told the COs that he would “act out” when released.  
J.A. 604.  Because he was “loud” and “making demands,” 
prison officials declined to remove him from the restraint 
chair.  J.A. 196.  He was finally released a couple hours later 
once officials were satisfied that he had calmed down. 
 All told, Young was confined in the restraint chair 
from approximately 8:46 p.m. to approximately 10:30 a.m. 
the next morning—a nearly fourteen-hour period that 
significantly exceeded the two-hour maximum recommended 
by the chair’s manufacturer and the eight-hour maximum, 
absent special authorization, permitted by the prison’s 
regulations.  See J.A. 180.  Upon release, Young was shaking 
uncontrollably and repeatedly complained that he was “cold 
down to his bones” because of the air conditioning blowing 
on his naked body for fourteen hours.  J.A. 287.  His legs 
were so numb that he could not walk, and he had to be 
wheeled back to the RHU in the chair.5  As Defendants’ 
                                              
 5 Young’s cell door was inadvertently opened again on 
September 22, 2009.  From the surveillance video, it is 
unclear whether he fell out of his cell or ran out.  Regardless, 
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counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no evidence in the 
record that anyone provided the requisite authorization to 
exceed the prison’s eight-hour maximum.  Oral Argument at 
44:01-49:49, available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral 
argument/audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3. 
II. Procedural Background 
 Young initiated suit in March 2010 and, in August 
2010, filed an amended complaint, claiming, among other 
things, that his placement in the restraint chair was purely 
punitive and constituted excessive force in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.  The Defendants moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that their actions were justified by Young’s 
extensive disciplinary history.  In addition, Young filed a 
motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of an 
investigative report by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
regarding the treatment of mentally ill prisoners in the 
Pennsylvania prison system and also requested that the 
District Court provide him with funding for a mental health 
expert.   
                                                                                                     
most of the reports of the incident state that he “lunged” at 
Officer Biagini, who was just outside the cell, J.A. 404, and 
that Officer Biagini was not harmed by Young.  Following 
the incident, Young was strip searched and returned to his 
cell.  Young’s Eighth Amendment claim is not based on this 
incident.  He references it to demonstrate that the COs’ 
response on September 20th involved the use of excessive 
force because, following the arguably more serious event on 
September 22nd, he was not placed in the restraint chair and 
instead was returned to his cell in the RHU. 
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 The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, denied Young’s motion to stay, and 
declined to allocate funds for an expert.  Focusing on 
Young’s “paramount claim” that “Defendants violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a prolonged 
period of strict mechanical restraint in the restraint chair,”  the 
District Court concluded that the “Defendants acted 
professionally and within constitutional parameters in 
subduing and placing Plaintiff in a restraint chair for about 
fourteen hours . . . .”  Young v. Beard, Civ. No. 10-0284, 
2013 WL 5230796, at *8, *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2013).  
Specifically, the District Court found that Young was 
“agitated” and the Defendants brought him “under control 
using minimal force” especially since he indicated he would 
“act out” when released and he was “violence-prone,” 
mentally ill, and suicidal.  Id. at *11.  The District Court also 
found the record lacked evidence that Young suffered “actual 
harm,” let alone “any risk of ‘serious’ harm, considering not 
only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood 
that the harm will actually occur, but any evidence that 
unwilling exposure to that risk violate[d] contemporary 
standards of decency.”  Id. at *12.  The District Court 
therefore concluded that the Defendants did not use excessive 
force and granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  Young timely appealed.   
10 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.6  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order granting summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  See Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 
415.  We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Ruehl v. Viacom, 
Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  If, on the other hand, 
“reasonable minds could differ . . . [then] an issue of material 
fact remains . . . for the trier of fact, and the grant of summary 
judgment . . . must be reversed.” J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. 
Fid. Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
IV. Analysis 
 The main issue presented on appeal is whether the 
District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Defendants by concluding that they did not violate 
Young’s Eighth Amendment rights when they strapped him 
in a restraint chair, naked, for fourteen hours, in the absence 
of any imminent threat of bodily harm to himself or others. 
Young argues that his placement in the restraint chair 
constituted use of “excessive force,” relying on the Supreme 
                                              
 6 The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  For ease of 
reference, we refer to the District Court throughout.   
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Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).7  
Appellant’s Br. 31.  The Defendants argue that we should 
analyze this as a “conditions of confinement” case under 
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment because it did not 
analyze the case under Hope and failed to draw all reasonable 
inferences from the facts in Young’s favor.   
 A. The Applicable Eighth Amendment Framework 
 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of 
“cruel and unusual punishments.”  U.S. Const. amend. VIII; 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986).  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition both to bar 
prison officials from using excessive force against inmates, 
see Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992), and to 
impose affirmative duties on prison officials to “provide 
humane conditions of confinement,” see Farmer v. Brennan, 
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  Depending on which of these 
Eighth Amendment claims a plaintiff seeks to pursue, 
different elements must be proven and different lines of cases 
applied.  While claims of use of excessive force require 
consideration of “the need for the application of force, the 
relationship between the need and the amount of force that 
                                              
 7 He also relies on Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 
326-27 (3d Cir. 2009), where we reversed a grant of summary 
judgment on a prisoner’s claim of excessive force.  While 
Giles also analyzes the use of force on a prisoner who was 
already subdued, it is of limited applicability as it does not 
address Hope or the use of restraint chairs or other 




was used, and the extent of injury inflicted,” Whitley, 475 
U.S. at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 
claims concerning conditions of confinement require a 
plaintiff to show that the prison conditions “pos[ed] a 
substantial risk of serious harm” and that the prison officials 
were deliberately indifferent to that risk, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
834. 
 The parties dispute whether Young’s claims regarding 
the use of the four-point restraint chair, i.e., a mechanical 
restraint, fall into the category of excessive force or 
conditions of confinement, and, as one district court has 
observed, our “[c]ase law does not provide a clear answer for 
which analysis applies.”  Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F. 
Supp. 2d 226, 248 (M.D. Pa. 2009).  We last addressed the 
issue of whether the use of a restraint chair constituted an 
Eighth Amendment violation in Fuentes.  However, that case, 
decided before Hope, is distinguishable on its facts and left 
open the issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints 
should be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s excessive 
force or conditions of confinement jurisprudence.   
 In Fuentes, the inmate began kicking his cell door and 
yelling for a CO, while complaining that another inmate 
urinated in his cell.  206 F.3d at 339.  The COs cuffed 
Fuentes through his food slot and entered his cell to conduct a 
search.  Id.  A struggle ensued, and the COs eventually 
wrestled Fuentes to the floor.  Id.  Fuentes continued to yell 
while one CO held him on the ground as another cuffed his 
legs.  Id.  At the same time, the Assistant Warden authorized 
use of the restraint chair for eight hours, in accord with the 
prison’s regulations.  Id. at 339, 340.  Fuentes argued that use 
of the restraint chair was purely punitive and violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights because he was no longer a threat 
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once he was restrained.  Id. at 340, 343-44.  Because it was 
“undisputed that the prison policy for the use of the restraint 
chair was followed,” we concluded that the prison officials 
were not deliberately indifferent to Fuentes’s health or well-
being, consistent with a conditions of confinement analysis.  
Id. at 345.  We also concluded that the prison officials did not 
place Fuentes in the chair “maliciously and sadistically to 
cause harm,” consistent with an excessive force analysis.  Id. 
at 345-46.   
 Despite some facial similarities to Young’s case, the 
facts of Fuentes are sufficiently different that its holding is of 
limited applicability here for three reasons.  First, Fuentes’ 
placement in the restraint chair occurred contemporaneously 
with the physical altercation with the COs.  That is, the chair 
was an instrument used by prison officials to subdue an 
actively combative prisoner.  In contrast, Young never 
engaged in a physical altercation and was placed in the 
restraint chair while entirely docile.   
 Second, Fuentes’ placement in the restraint chair was 
in accord with prison regulations, as he posed an immediate 
threat to the COs, and he was released after eight hours.  
Young, on the other hand, was not an immediate threat to 
himself or others, as he was shackled and face down on the 
ground, and there is no evidence that any prison official 
authorized Young’s confinement in the restraint chair in 
excess of the eight-hour maximum otherwise permitted under 
the prison regulations.  See Oral Argument at 44:01-49:49, 
available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/ 
audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3. 
 Finally, Fuentes does not answer the question of what 
legal framework applies in the face of a claim that the use of 
14 
 
mechanical restraints violated a prisoner’s Eighth 
Amendment rights.  See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 249 
(“The Third Circuit has not since considered the 
constitutionality of mechanical constraints, but to the extent 
that Fuentes . . . conflict[s] with Hope, the Supreme Court 
case is binding authority.”).  The Supreme Court’s more 
recent decision in Hope, however, does.   
 In Hope, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Larry Hope, an Alabama 
prisoner, fell asleep during a “morning bus ride to [his] chain 
gang’s worksite.”  Hope, 536 U.S. at 734.  He “was less than 
prompt in responding to an order to get off the bus” and 
eventually got into a “wrestling match with a guard.”  Id.  
Hope was handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported 
back to the prison where he was cuffed on a “hitching post.”  
Id.  “The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained 
shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin.”  Id. at 734-35.  
He was chained to the post for seven hours and was given 
water only once, denied bathroom breaks, and taunted by the 
guards.  Id. at 735. 
 After noting that “unnecessary and wanton inflictions 
of pain are those that are totally without penological 
justification,” the Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts 
alleged by Hope, “the Eighth Amendment violation is 
obvious.”  Id. at 737-38 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Court explained:   
 Any safety concerns had long since 
abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to 
the hitching post because Hope had already 
been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, 
15 
 
and transported back to the prison.  He was 
separated from his work squad and not given 
the opportunity to return to work.  Despite the 
clear lack of an emergency situation, the 
respondents knowingly subjected him to a 
substantial risk of physical harm, to 
unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and 
the restricted position of confinement for a 7-
hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat 
of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and 
to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created 
a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.  
The use of the hitching post under these 
circumstances violated the “basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). This punitive 
treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of 
“wanton and unnecessary” pain that our 
precedent clearly prohibits. 
Id. at 738 (footnote omitted).   
 The Defendants do not dispute that Hope controls as to 
which Eighth Amendment test applies to analyze the use of 
mechanical restraints.  See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 
249 (Hope is the controlling case on the “constitutionality of 
mechanical restraints”).  They contend, however, that the 
Supreme Court in Hope “applied the conditions of 
confinement/deliberate indifference test of Farmer v. 
Brennan.”  Appellees’ Br. 34-35.  We disagree because the 
language and reasoning of the opinion reflect that the Court, 
in fact, was applying the excessive force test.  
16 
 
 After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that “unnecessary and wanton infliction[s] of pain . . . 
constitute[ ] cruel and unusual punishment,” including those 
that are “totally without penological justification.”  Hope, 536 
U.S. at 737 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 and Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court referred to Farmer briefly but its 
analysis of whether the use of mechanical restraints violated 
the Eighth Amendment indisputably began and ended in 
terms drawn from its excessive force jurisprudence, i.e., 
Whitley, because it held that Hope’s “punitive treatment” 
amounted to the “gratuitous infliction of ‘wanton and 
unnecessary’ pain” that was “clearly prohibit[ed].”  Id. at 738.  
Thus, in Hope, the Supreme Court applied its excessive force 
jurisprudence for the first time to a prisoner’s allegation that 
his placement in mechanical restraints was unconstitutional. 
 We conclude, under Hope, that Young’s claims should 
be analyzed under the excessive force test and that such 
analysis demonstrates that the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment was in error.  We now turn to the task of 
applying this test to the record before us.8 
                                              
 8 While we conclude that the particular claims here 
concerning the use of mechanical restraints are properly 
analyzed under the excessive force test, we note that the 
record in this case, reflecting Young’s detention in solitary 
confinement for over six years, and the DOJ investigative 
report, detailing prolonged solitary confinement at SCI-
Greene and five other Pennsylvania prisons, raise serious 
concerns under the Eighth Amendment’s conditions of 
confinement test.  As Justice Kennedy recently observed, 
“[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”  
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 B. Application of the Excessive Force Test In  
Light Of Hope  
 
 The District Court concluded that there was no Eighth 
Amendment violation because Young was “known-to-be 
violent,” was exposed to “minimal force,” promised to “act 
out if released,” and was not punched, kicked or “otherwise 
manhandl[ed]” by the COs.  Young, 2013 WL 5230796, at 
*13.  We conclude from our independent review of the 
videotape and record evidence that the District Court failed to 
draw all reasonable inferences in Young’s favor and that, 
when those inferences are properly drawn, there are genuine 
disputes of material fact as to whether the Defendants’ use of 
the restraint chair in this case violated the Eighth 
Amendment.   
 Force that is used “maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm” violates the Eighth 
                                                                                                     
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of 
Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 325 (2006) 
(noting the common side-effects of solitary confinement, such 
as panic, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal 
behaviors)); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “it is well 
documented that . . . prolonged solitary confinement produces 
numerous deleterious harms”).  The record in this case, 
including details of Young’s visual and auditory 
hallucinations and his numerous suicide attempts, makes 
palpable “[t]he human toll wrought by extended terms of 
isolation.”  Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).   
18 
 
Amendment.  Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  While not every 
“malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 
cause of action,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, the “[a]pplication of 
force by . . . prison guards exceeding that which is reasonable 
and necessary under the circumstances” may be actionable, 
Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 827 (3d Cir. 1984).  See 
also Giles, 571 F.3d at 326 (an officer “may not . . . use 
gratuitous force against an inmate who has been subdued”).   
 As applied to mechanical restraints, the Supreme Court 
in Hope identified particular criteria relevant to the use of 
excessive force test, holding that (1) where the inmate had 
“already been subdued, handcuffed, [and] placed in leg 
irons,” and (2) there was a “clear lack of an emergency 
situation” such that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since 
abated,” then (3) subjecting the inmate to “substantial risk of 
physical harm” and “unnecessary pain” serves no penological 
justification.  Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also Rhodes, 452 
U.S. at 346 (“Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of 
pain are those that are ‘totally without penological 
justification.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 
(1976)).  Measured by this yardstick, Young has raised 
genuine disputes of material fact for a jury to ascertain 
whether he suffered an Eighth Amendment violation. 
 First, like the inmate in Hope, it appears that Young 
was already subdued when subjected to mechanical restraint.  
He was not violent, combative, or self-destructive at any point 
during the incident leading up to his prolonged confinement 
in the restraint chair.  On the contrary, he was safely secured 
and shackled after voluntarily complying with the COs’ 
instructions to step into the shower.  And immediately prior to 
being placed in the restraint chair, he was naked and subdued, 
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face down on the ground and held by four COs, with his 
hands and legs cuffed.  See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also 
Giles, 571 F.3d at 327 (“striking and kicking a subdued, 
nonresisting inmate in the side” was not “reasonable or 
necessary under established law”).  Given these facts, 
“reasonable minds could differ” as to whether Young posed a 
risk to himself or others when he was placed in the restraint 
chair.  See J.E. Mamiye, 813 F.2d at 617 (citations omitted). 
 While the District Court found that Young’s threats of 
future harm were sufficient to justify his extended placement 
in the restraint chair, the record, when drawing all inferences 
in Young’s favor, supports a contrary interpretation.  Video 
recording reflects that after being strapped in the chair for 
nearly eight hours, Young did comment that he would likely 
be placed back in the restraint chair because “that’s just how 
it is,” J.A. 196, and that, following the stress of nearly 
fourteen hours of confinement, he was agitated and told two 
COs he would “act out” when released, J.A. 604.  When 
considered on the whole, however, any number of reasonable 
inferences could be drawn in Young’s favor from these 
statements, not the least of which being (1) that the 
Defendants had consistently used the chair to punish Young, 
and (2) that Young was upset and angry about an unjustified, 
punitive confinement. 
 Second, there is ample evidence that the events of 
September 20th did not rise to the level of an “emergency 
situation,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, despite the District Court’s 
characterization of “a highly energized situation,” Young, 
2013 WL 5230796, at *5 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Young only left his cell because a CO 
inadvertently opened his cell door—far from a prison break; 
the incident lasted a mere seven minutes, during which two 
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COs chatted and laughed while they watched the scene 
unfold; and Young voluntarily complied with the COs’ 
instructions within that short time frame.  The COs then 
removed Young, shackled and subdued, from the common 
area and subjected him in a more controlled space to a prone 
strip search without resistance.  By this point, a reasonable 
jury could find that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since 
abated.”  Hope, 536 U.S. at 738. 
 Finally, there is a dispute of fact as to whether, despite 
the lack of an emergency situation and the evidence that 
Young was already subdued, the prison officials exposed 
Young to a “substantial risk of physical harm” and 
“unnecessary pain” by placing him in the restraint chair.  See 
id.  The prison’s own regulations authorize use of the restraint 
chair only for “protection of self or others,” J.A. 626, to 
“prevent an inmate from injuring [himself] or other persons,” 
J.A. 629, and to “safely restrain a combative or self-
destructive person,” id.  Yet the COs and prison officials not 
only placed Young in the restraint chair but did so for nearly 
fourteen hours, far exceeding the eight-hour maximum 
permitted without special authorization.  See Hope, 536 U.S. 
at 738.   
 At the outset, Young’s restraints were so tight that he 
cried out in pain, and during the extended period he remained 
in the restraint chair, Young was naked, with his genitals 
partially exposed and an air conditioner blowing cold air on 
him.  When he was finally released from this extreme 
confinement, Young was shaking uncontrollably and 
complained that he was “cold down to his bones.”  J.A. 287.  
His legs, numb from the restricted position his body was 
forced to endure over fourteen hours, could no longer hold his 
weight and he had to be wheeled back to the RHU.  On this 
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record, Young is entitled to have a jury determine whether he 
was subjected to “a substantial risk of physical harm” without 
penological justification and whether the Defendants thus 
“violated the basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment.”  See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (quoting Trop, 356 
U.S. at 100) (quotation marks omitted). 
 In sum, applying the use of excessive force test, 
analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Hope, and 
drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the nonmoving 
party, we cannot say that “there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 C. The Issue of Qualified Immunity 
 The Defendants also ask us—in a single sentence—to 
affirm on the ground of qualified immunity.  The District 
Court did not reach the issue and the availability of the 
defense was not briefed on appeal.  In Hope, the Supreme 
Court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified 
immunity because their actions violated “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (quotation marks 
omitted).  We will leave this issue for the District Court to 
address in the first instance on remand, considering (1) 
whether “the state of the law” in 2009, including Hope, gave 
the Defendants “fair warning that their alleged treatment of 
[Young] was unconstitutional,” 536 U.S. at 741, and (2) 
whether Young’s confinement in the restraint chair violated 
prison regulations of which the Defendants were aware, see, 
e.g., id. at 743-44 (prison officials’ violation of Department of 
Corrections’ regulations for restraining inmates at a hitching 
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post was relevant to the question of fair warning); Treats v. 
Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Prison 
regulations governing the conduct of correctional officers are 
. . . relevant in determining whether an inmate’s right was 
clearly established.”).  Cf. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (observing that “an 
officer act[ing] contrary to her training . . . does not itself 
negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be 
warranted”).   
 D. Young’s Remaining Arguments  
 Young also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by refusing to stay the summary judgment 
proceedings pending the issuance of the DOJ’s final 
investigative report and erred in refusing to allocate funds for 
him to retain a mental health expert.  We review for abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s denial of Young’s motion to 
stay and its refusal to allocate funds for an expert.  See 
Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 
544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976) (a district court may stay 
proceedings “[i]n the exercise of its sound discretion”); see 
also Fed. R. Evid. 706 (giving trial judge broad discretion to 
appoint expert).   
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Young’s motion to stay the proceedings.9  At that 
                                              
 9 Young argues that the factors set forth in Golden 
Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, 
Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980), weighed in favor of 




time, the only issue remaining in the case, by Young’s 
                                                                                                     
 (1) the interest of the plaintiffs in 
proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or 
any particular aspect of it, and the potential 
prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden 
which any particular aspect of the proceedings 
may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience 
of the court in the management of its cases, and 
the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the 
interests of persons not parties to the civil 
litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in 
the pending civil and criminal litigation. 
 
Id. at 56.  
 
 While these factors provide a useful analytical 
framework when deciding whether to stay a civil case 
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, Young does 
not cite, and we have not found, any authority applying them 
in the context of a motion for stay pending an agency’s 
investigative report.  See, e.g., id. at 55 (denying stay because 
there was “no basis in law for the notion that defendants in a 
criminal prosecution, antitrust or otherwise, have a due 
process right to stay proceedings in related civil actions lest 
they be forced to defend themselves on two legal fronts 
simultaneously”).  Indeed, all of the authority cited by Young 
is in the context of parallel criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., 
SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. 
Supp. 2d 523, 527, 529 (D.N.J. 1998).  Given the very 
different issues and interests implicated by such parallel 
proceedings, we decline to import that framework here.   
24 
 
admission, was “his Eighth Amendment, excessive force 
challenge to [his] fourteen hour restraint in a restrictive 
movement chair” at SCI-Greene.  J.A. 829 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The District Court 
properly concluded that the DOJ’s preliminary investigative 
report regarding SCI-Cresson was “irrelevant and immaterial 
to that sole claim” and that Young effectively requested an 
“indefinite” stay because there was no indication when the 
DOJ’s final report would be issued.  Id. at 829, 839.  While 
this appeal was pending, however, the DOJ issued its final 
investigative report, detailing the “dehumanizing and cruel” 
conditions that attend the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections’ (“DOC”) use of solitary confinement at six 
prison facilities, including SCI-Greene, where prisoners are 
reportedly confined to a cell, less than 100 square feet, for 
twenty-three hours a day, exposed to unsanitary and 
inhospitable conditions, and subjected to the excessive use of 
restraints.  Investigation of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr. Use of 
Solitary Confinement on Prisoners with Serious Mental 
Illness and/or Intellectual Disabilities, Appellant’s Br., Ex. C, 
at 4, 9-11.10  The report observes that solitary confinement 
commonly includes the “[u]nnecessary and excessive use of 
                                              
 10 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation 
concerning a similar report relied upon by the Eighth Circuit 
in Hope, we take judicial notice of the DOJ’s final 
investigative report here.  536 U.S. at 737 n.7 (observing that 
the DOJ report was not before the District Court but the 
Eleventh Circuit took judicial notice and referenced it several 
times in its decision); see also id. at 737 (noting that “the 
court relied on . . . the results of a [DOJ] report that found 




[full-body] restraints . . . as a means to discipline prisoners by 
causing discomfort or pain,” id. at 11, and concludes that the 
long-term use of solitary confinement on mentally ill 
prisoners “violate[s] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” id. at 3. 
 Young argues on appeal that the final DOJ report is 
both relevant and admissible.  The report reflects, among 
other things, that rather than providing mental health 
treatment, “staff members routinely respond to [a] prisoner 
exhibiting symptoms of . . . mental illness by making his 
living conditions even more inhospitable,” including 24/7 
confinement; denying the prisoner bedding material, clothing, 
and running water; restricting prisoners to even smaller cells; 
and subjecting them to the “excessive use of restraints.”  Id. at 
10-11.  It also describes that during their solitary 
confinement, the prisoners’ senses are assaulted with foul 
smells from the “inadequate sanitation and ventilation”—
including the stench of human excrement that mentally ill 
prisoners smear on the wall and which might remain for 
days—and loud noises from the “yelling and banging of 
neighboring prisoners.”  Id. at 9-10.  According to the report, 
most cells have no windows, depriving prisoners of any 
natural light, though they never enjoy a respite, even at night, 
from the relentless overhead lighting within their cells.  Id. at 
9.  Five days a week, those who are willing to submit to a 
strip search are “led by tether,” “arms and legs shackled,” to 
“an empty and caged outdoor pen” for a single hour.  Id. at 9-
10.  Solitary confinement includes a total restriction on 
contact visitations, id. at 10, which means that the only 
human touch these inmates experience is from the COs 
shackling them, and a restriction to a single monthly non-
contact visitation, id., which means that, but for an hour a 
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month, their only human interactions are limited to the same 
COs.   
 According to the report, the use of solitary 
confinement on mentally ill prisoners “exacerbates their 
mental illness and leads to serious psychological and 
physiological harms,” “including psychosis, trauma, severe 
depression, serious self-injury, and suicide,” id. at 3, 7, and as 
a result of their prolonged isolation, the prisoners express an 
inability “to conform their conduct to the prison’s rules in a 
way that would allow them out of their isolation cell” and 
“accumulate[] years of disciplinary time . . . fear[ing] they 
[will] never be returned to general population,” id. at 8.  
Having been denied mental health services, and with their 
mental illness exacerbated by prolonged solitary confinement, 
the prisoners are reportedly subjected to excessive restraints 
as a form of punishment, with “more than 260 full-body 
restraint incidents” over eighteen months, of which “almost 
75% lasted longer than 7 hours, and 15% lasted longer than 
12 hours.”  Id. at 11.   
 Young notes the many parallels between the findings 
in the final report and his own experience, pointing out that 
not only was he subjected to excessive restraint, lasting 
almost fourteen hours, but also that he suffers from many 
forms of serious mental illness,11 that his mental illness has 
                                              
 11 The DOC defines “serious mental illness” as “a 
substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly 
impairs judgment, behavior, [or] capacity to recognize reality 
or cope with the ordinary demands of life.”  Appellant’s Br. 
Ex. C at 4-5 (quoting Pa. Dep’t Corr., Access to Mental 
Health Care, Policy 13.8.1, Section 2-Delivery of Mental 
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been exacerbated by his prolonged solitary confinement, and 
that his extensive disciplinary history cannot be considered in 
isolation from his history of mental illness, rendering the final 
report highly relevant.  He also argues that the final report 
should be deemed admissible, pursuant to the hearsay 
exception for public records.  See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (a 
“record or statement of a public office” is admissible “in a 
civil case” if it sets out “factual findings from a legally 
authorized investigation” and “the opponent does not show 
that the source of information nor other circumstances 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness”).  Young cites our decision 
in Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 669-70 (3d 
Cir. 2002), as authority for admitting a trustworthy public 
report containing legal conclusions into evidence pursuant to 
Rule 803(8).   
 The Defendants do not dispute that the report is a 
public document nor do they challenge its trustworthiness, but 
they argue that it makes “general” and “inadmissible” legal 
conclusions.  Appellees’ Br. 29.  The Defendants also argue 
that admission of the DOJ’s “opinion” that “restraint chair 
confinement ‘often’ is punitive for severely mentally ill RHU 
inmates held elsewhere” would be “unduly prejudicial in the 
most fundamental sense.”  Id. at 29-30. 
 Because the District Court did not address any 
evidentiary issues pertaining to the final report in deciding 
Young’s motion to stay, it should do so on remand, 
considering whether the report here, to the extent it contains 
relevant findings and conclusions, constitutes a trustworthy 
                                                                                                     
Health Services § A.1.a.(2) (2013)) (alteration in original) 




public report admissible pursuant to Rule 803(8) and whether 
the admission of some or all of the report is not merely 
prejudicial to the Defendants, but “unfairly prejudicial,” as 
that is the touchstone for exclusion.  Goodman, 293 F.3d at 
670.  The parties may renew their evidentiary arguments on 
remand.   
 Finally, we agree with the Defendants that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s request 
to appoint a mental health expert pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706 because a court does not have the power to tilt 
the scales in favor of one litigant by funding its expert 
witnesses under that Rule.   Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 
468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987).  However, the District Court could 
appoint an expert for the purpose of assisting the Court, and 
the rule is clear that an expert so appointed should be paid 
either from “funds provided by law”12 or “by the parties in 
such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and 
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.”  Young, 59 
F.3d at 1169-70 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Boring, 833 F.2d at 474. 
V. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court 
improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s 
                                              
 12 The Western District maintains a “fund to cover 
reasonable costs” incurred in pro bono civil rights 
representations. See Pro Bono Counsel in Prisoner Civil 
Rights Cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Pages/ProBonoPC.htm (last 
accessed August 24, 2015).     
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controlling precedent in Hope and failing to draw all 
reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of Young.  The 
District Court’s order of summary judgment will be vacated 
and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.    
